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A GROSS INJUSTICE:
PROVING AGE DISCRIMINATION BY
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS UNDER
THE ADEA IN THE WAKE OF
GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
CHRISTINE R. LEWIS†
“Especially in the employment field, discrimination based on
age is cruel and self-defeating; it destroys the spirit of those who
want to work and it denies the Nation[] the contribution they
could make if they were working.”1

INTRODUCTION
“I’d be better off with someone younger,” says the supervisor
to the fifty-three year old post office employee during her sixty
day evaluation. Shocked and offended, the employee gets up and
leaves, slamming the door on her way out. The next day, when
the employee reports to work for her shift, she is informed that
she has been let go, and that she must pack her things and leave
immediately.
The cause given for her termination is
insubordination—treating a supervisor in an unprofessional
manner—in violation of company policy.2 Was age a cause of this
employee’s termination? Probably. Was age the cause of this
employee’s termination? Probably not.

†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.S., 2010, Fordham University. Thank you to Professor
Adam Zimmerman for all of his guidance and patience, and to AUSA David Eskew
for introducing me to Gross. This Note would not exist without their help, and I am
grateful to both of them. A very special thank you to Lisa Ann Lewis for a lifetime of
editing with love.
1
H.R. REP. NO. 93-913, at 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849.
2
See Harley v. Potter, 416 F. App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Harley v. Donahoe, 132 S. Ct. 844 (2011). The facts of Harley are reproduced here in
a modified version for illustrative purposes.
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The “baby boomers,” those seventy-five million individuals
born between 1946 and 1964, are impacting today’s workplace
statistics in a tremendous way.3 There are approximately sixtynine million American workers over the age of forty in today’s
workforce.4 In the private sector, approximately 45.3% of the
workforce is between fourty and sixty-one years old.5 This
percentage is far greater among federal employees, with 64.1% of
workers falling within this age group.6 Both of these percentages
are significantly higher than they were merely a decade ago.7 As
the average age of the American worker rises, so too does the
prevalence of age discrimination in the workplace. Between 2007
and 2008, there was a 30% increase in the number of age
discrimination claims brought against employers in the United
States.8
The measures in place to protect against age discrimination
in the workplace have become increasingly important as their
applicability has come to cover a greater percentage of
employees. One such measure is the Age Discrimination in
In enacting the ADEA,
Employment Act (the “ADEA”).9
Congress’ purpose was “to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment.”10 The Act’s implications are far-reaching.
3

Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After All These Years? The ADEA, the Roberts
Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as Differential Treatment, 46 AM. BUS.
L.J. 607, 607 (2009); see also Marilyn Geewax, For Baby Boomers, the Job Market’s
Even Worse, NPR (May 1, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=126426518.
4
The Aging Workforce in America, IMEC, http://imecred.imec.org/imec.nsf/All/
Aging_Workforce (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
5
STUART GREENFIELD, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: THE CURRENT SITUATION 1 (2007), available at
http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Public-Sector-Employment_Greenfield.
pdf.
6
Id.
7
FREDRICA D. KRAMER & DEMETRA S. NIGHTINGALE, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., AGING BABY BOOMERS IN A NEW WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM iii (2001), available at http://www.doleta.gov/Seniors/
other_docs/AgingBoomers.pdf.
8
Steve Vogel, EEOC Examines Age Discrimination as Numbers of Claims Rise,
WASH. POST (July 16, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503760.html.
9
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
10
Id. § 621(b).
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The ADEA applies to all employers with twenty or more
employees, “including federal, state, and local governments, and
prohibits discrimination against a person over the age of forty
because of his or her age with respect to any term, condition, or
privilege of employment, including hiring, firing, promoting,
laying off, compensation, benefits, job assignments, and
training.”11 Different sections of the ADEA apply to different
types of employers. Section 623 (“the non-federal provision”)
applies to all non-federal employers,12 while § 633a (“the federal
provision”) applies solely to federal employers.13
Although the ADEA is fairly clear as to whom it applies and
the types of adverse actions it protects against, how it should be
enforced at the judicial level has proven to be more ambiguous.
Specifically lacking from the ADEA is a description of the type of
causation that a plaintiff must demonstrate when bringing a
claim. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,14 the Supreme
Court interpreted the ADEA in an attempt to clarify this
uncertainty. Relying closely on the statutory language of the
non-federal provision—under which the claim in Gross was
brought—the Court held that “a plaintiff bringing a disparatetreatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of
the challenged adverse employment action.”15 A mixed-motive
analysis, comparable to that used in Title VII discrimination
cases and used by many courts when faced with ADEA claims,
was deemed inadequate.16
Under the § 623 non-federal
provision, age must be the reason an employee is treated
adversely, not just one reason amongst many.17
However, in clarifying the causation standard to be used in
§ 623 non-federal claims, the Court cast further uncertainty upon
the causation standard to be used in § 633a claims against
federal employers. In Gross, the Court made no reference to

11

Jeffrey S. Klein et al., Employee Selection, in 38TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 2009, at 1005 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook
2009).
12
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
13
Id. § 633a (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
14
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
15
Id. at 180.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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§ 633a, focusing solely on § 623 and its precise language.18 It
remains unclear what type of causation the federal provision
requires; thus, various courts have interpreted Gross’ impact on
§ 633a differently. Some courts have found that Gross should be
extended to cover § 633a and federal employers, while others
have found that it should not, and many have applied it to
federal employers with no discussion of Gross’ relevance
whatsoever.19
This Note argues that the “but-for” causation required under
Gross should not be extended to apply to ADEA claims brought
against federal employers because the reasoning of Gross does
not support a broad expansion of its holding, and because a less
stringent burden of proof is more appropriate in the federal
employment context. Part I explains the current requirements
placed on a plaintiff bringing a § 623 ADEA claim against a nonfederal employer, as laid out by the Supreme Court in Gross.
Part II explores the applicability of Gross to § 633a of the ADEA,
which applies to federal employers, and compares the reasoning
of those courts that have chosen to apply Gross in the federal
employment context with that of those courts that have refrained
from doing so. Finally, Part III proposes that Gross should not be
expanded to require “but-for” causation in claims brought against
federal employers under § 633a of the ADEA for a number of
statutory interpretation and policy reasons, and instead
recommends a “substantial factor” causation test in which age
must be material to an adverse employment action, but need not
be the “but-for” cause.
I.

BACKGROUND

Employment discrimination in the American workforce is a
long recognized and heavily litigated issue, and protections
against it come from a variety of different sources, including
common law and both state and federal statutes.20 Congress has
acknowledged that “ ‘[d]iscrimination based on age . . . can be as
great an evil in our society as discrimination based on race or
religion or any other characteristic which ignores a person’s
unique status as an individual and treats him or her as a

18
19
20

Id. at 170.
See infra Part II.
Klein et al., supra note 11, at 1001.
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member of some arbitrarily-defined group.’ ”21 This section first
describes the ADEA, the statutory basis of most age
discrimination claims, and then discusses the implications of the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.
A.

Statutory Protection Against Age Discrimination: The ADEA

The statute that takes center stage in the battle against age
discrimination is the ADEA. First enacted in 1967, the ADEA
has been protecting workers from discrimination for over forty
years.22 It applies to all workers over the age of forty in the
private sector, as well as in local, state, and federal
government.23 The breadth of this protected class helps to
identify and resolve many age-related issues.
Section 623 of the ADEA prohibits age discrimination by
non-federal employers. In relevant part, it states that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual’s age.”24
Section 633a of the ADEA prohibits age discrimination by
federal employers. In relevant part, it states that:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . in military
departments . . . , in executive agencies . . . , in the United
States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission, in
those units in the government of the District of Columbia
having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of
the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions
in the competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution, and
in the Government Printing Office, the Government
Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age.25

21
H.R. REP. NO. 93-913, at 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849
(quoting a Presidential message supporting an extension of ADEA in March 1972).
22
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
23
Klein et al., supra note 11.
24
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
25
Id. § 633a(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (emphasis added).
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Despite Congress’ attempt to protect employees through this
legislation, enforcing the ADEA at the judicial level has been
problematic.26 Questions involving the burden of persuasion to
be used and type of causation required have been particularly
troubling. When interpreting the ADEA, courts have often
looked to another Civil Rights era statute, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), for guidance. “Title VII covers
employers with 15 or more employees, and prohibits employers
from making adverse employment decisions based upon an
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”27
Because both the ADEA and Title VII are intended to prevent
discrimination in the workplace, albeit different types of
discrimination, courts have often drawn analogies between the
two and borrowed from the jurisprudence of one when
interpreting the other.28
The ADEA and Title VII “inform each other in important
ways.”29 Up until 2010, one such way was the type of causation
analysis that courts required in both cases.30 Many courts used
the burden shifting analysis established in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins31 in both ADEA and Title VII cases. Under the Price
Waterhouse analysis, used where there is direct evidence of
discrimination, a plaintiff has to prove that discrimination played
a motivating role in an adverse employment action.32 Where this
is established, the defendant then has the opportunity to prove
that the adverse employment action still would have occurred for
a different reason, even if the discriminatory motive had not been
present.33 Such proof can serve as an affirmative defense for the
26
See Tracey, supra note 3, at 608. (“[A]s now interpreted, the ADEA is
confusing, convoluted, and problematic.”).
27
Klein et al., supra note 11, at 1001.
28
See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 2008)
(applying a Title VII analysis in an ADEA case), rev’d, 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
29
Tracey, supra note 3, at 609.
30
See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–75 (banning the Price Waterhouse analysis in
ADEA cases).
31
490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Court specified that the
analysis it set forth was not technically burden shifting, but instead an initial
burden placed on the plaintiff which may be rebutted through what is “most
appropriately deemed an affirmative defense.” Id. at 246. However, in later cases,
including Gross (to be discussed shortly), the Court references the Price Waterhouse
“burden-shifting framework,” so this Note utilizes the same language in discussing
this concept. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–74.
32
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45.
33
Id.
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accused employer.34 Although Price Waterhouse involved sex
discrimination under Title VII,35 courts nonetheless used the
burden shifting analysis in both the ADEA and Title VII
contexts.36 This allowed a plaintiff to succeed on a claim where
age was not the “but-for” cause of an adverse employment action,
but merely “a factor in the employment decision at the moment it
was made,” so long as the employer could not prove that the
employee would have been negatively impacted in the same
manner for some other reason.37 Even “a mixture of legitimate
and illegitimate considerations” could serve as adequate proof of
discrimination.38 However, all of this changed with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
B.

Judicial Interpretation of the ADEA: Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.

In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Court put a
swift end to the use of the mixed-motive analysis in ADEA § 623
claims by instead requiring a showing of “but-for” causation in all
§ 623 claims.39 In Gross, the plaintiff, Jack Gross, began working
for FBL Financial Group (“FBL” or “the company”) in 1971.40
Gross worked for the company for over thirty years, and rose to
the position of “claims administration director.”41 However, in
2003, when Gross was fifty-four years old, he was reassigned to
the position of “claims project coordinator.”42 Many of his former
responsibilities were given to the newly appointed “claims
administration manager,” a woman in her early forties who had
previously been supervised by Gross.43 FBL stated that “Gross’
reassignment was part of a corporate restructuring” and

34

Id. at 246.
Id. at 231–32.
36
See, e.g., Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 571–72 (6th
Cir. 2003); Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2000);
Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.6 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Eighth
Circuit has applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to age discrimination claims).
37
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–41.
38
Id. at 241.
39
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
40
Id. at 170.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
35
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explained that Gross’ new position was “better suited to his
skills.”44
Gross “considered [his] reassignment a demotion
because of FBL’s reallocation of his former job responsibilities.”45
In 2004, Gross filed suit in federal district court alleging a
violation of his rights under the ADEA.46 Applying the mixedmotive burden shifting framework, the jury in the district court
found that age was a motivating factor in Gross’ reassignment
and awarded him $46,945.47 FBL then appealed the verdict to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, citing
an improper jury instruction.48 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
found that the jury had improperly applied the Price Waterhouse
framework, which is used in Title VII cases and which the Eighth
Circuit, at the time, also applied to ADEA cases.49 The court
found that Gross had failed to provide “ ‘[d]irect
evidence’ . . . ‘sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact
finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated’ the
adverse employment action.”50 Because Gross had not met his
initial burden of providing “direct evidence,” FBL never should
have been given the opportunity to prove that the illegitimate
factor was of no consequence in the decision.51 The Eighth
Circuit, therefore, found that the jury instruction below had been
flawed and remanded the case for a new trial.52
Gross then appealed the reversal, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In a 5-4 opinion, the majority opted not to use
the standard of proof set out by either the district court or the
Eighth Circuit and instead laid down a different causation
requirement.53 The Court held that “a plaintiff bringing a
disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause
of the challenged adverse employment action.”54
44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id. at 171.
48
Id. at 171.
49
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557
U.S. 167 (2009).
50
Id. at 359 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
51
Id. at 360.
52
Id. at 358.
53
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)
54
Id.
45
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The first step in the Court’s analysis was to definitively rule
out the Price Waterhouse burden shifting framework.55 The
Court clarified that the Price Waterhouse analysis should be
limited to the Title VII context and should never play a role in
§ 623 ADEA claims.56 The majority cautioned that “[w]hen
conducting statutory interpretation, we ‘must be careful not to
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute
without careful and critical examination.’ ”57 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that, because Congress specifically amended Title
VII to provide that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
used as a “motivating factor” would suffice to prove causation but
failed to make the same amendment to the ADEA’s language,
Congress did not intend for the same standard to apply in the
ADEA context.58
After outlining why a “motivating factor” test should not be
used, the Court’s second step was to establish the type of
causation test that should be used in § 623 ADEA claims.59 The
Court set forth a strict “but-for” causation requirement. In order
to meet the burden of proving “but-for” causation, a party must
show that in the absence of a precipitating event, a later event
simply would not have occurred.60 Unlike the “mixed-motive”
test, which considers an event a motivating factor—and therefore
a cause—so long as it “played a part or a role” in a decision,61 the
“but-for” test demands a much closer relationship between one
event and another. Simply playing a role is not enough.
Additionally, under the “but-for” test, the materiality of the
precipitating event is of no relevance. No matter how important
or wrongful a given event is, it is not the “but-for” cause unless
the result would not have occurred in its absence. This lack of a
materiality inquiry differentiates the “but-for” test from a
“substantial factor” test. A substantial factor test, discussed in
depth in Part III.B, weighs how material an event is in

55

Id. at 173.
Id. at 174 (“This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework
applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.”).
57
Id. (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
58
Id.
59
See id. at 175–76.
60
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
265 (5th ed. 1984).
61
Gross, 557 U.S. at 171. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56
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contributing to a given result.62 If one event is a “material
element” in bringing about another event, it will be considered its
cause.63 Materiality is of the utmost importance.
In the context of age discrimination, a “but-for” causation
requirement means that age must be the “ ‘reason’ that the
employer decided to act.”64 A claim “ ‘cannot succeed unless the
employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the
employer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome.’ ”65 In short, “but-for” causation means
that the adverse action would not have occurred unless
discrimination was present.66
In Gross, the Court’s primary reason for distinguishing the
ADEA from Title VII was the difference in statutory language
between the two. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas relied
extensively on the different language used by the drafters of the
ADEA. Turning to the dictionary to define “because of,” Thomas
concluded that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement
that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age
was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.”67
Four justices dissented, and Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer authored the two dissenting opinions. All four dissenting
justices joined in Justice Stevens’ opinion,68 while all but Justice
Stevens joined in Justice’s Breyer’s opinion.69 Justice Stevens
vehemently argued that it is not clear by its plain meaning that
“because of” means “but for.”70 He focused largely on the
similarities between the ADEA and Title VII and the courts’
earlier treatment of similar language in Title VII as allowing
proof of a mixed motive to be sufficient.71 He felt that the mixed-

62

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W.
45, 49 (Minn. 1920).
64
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
65
Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)) (explaining
Hazen).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 180–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 180–83.
63
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motive approach should continue to be used in ADEA claims and
that the “Court’s resurrection of the but-for causation standard
[was] unwarranted.”72
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer also felt that the mixedmotive analysis should be used in age discrimination cases.
Justice Breyer focused on the inadequacies of a “but-for” test,
arguing that because of the intangible nature of age
discrimination, proof of a mixed motive should suffice to prove
causation.73 He saw no problem with the jury instruction in
Gross that made age a motivating factor, and therefore a cause, if
it “played a part or a role in the defendant’s decision.”74 A “butfor” determination was not necessary in his opinion.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: APPLYING GROSS TO § 633A
In the wake of Gross, courts have split over the applicability
of Gross’ holding to ADEA § 633a claims. A majority of courts,
including the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, have
extended Gross’ “but-for” requirement to claims against federal
employers. Within this group, most courts have extended the
holding without acknowledging that it might not be applicable. A
smaller contingency within the majority has acknowledged the
potential difference, but reasoned that Gross should still be
extended to the federal claims in question. Other courts,
including the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, have
declined to extend Gross to claims against federal employers.
This minority has cited the differences between the governing
sections of the ADEA as the reason for not requiring a showing of
“but-for” causation against federal employers.
A.

Extending Gross

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is among those
courts that have applied Gross to a claim against a federal
employer without acknowledging that it might be inapplicable.
In Harley v. Potter,75 the court upheld the application of Gross in
a case against the Unites States Postal Service, an entity

72

Id. at 187.
Id. at 190–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 192.
75
416 F. App’x 748, 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The district court properly identified
Gross as the controlling legal standard.”).
73
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expressly governed by § 633a rather than § 623.76 Wanda Harley
was fired from her position as a post office employee after
refusing to sign an evaluation with which she disagreed.77
Another employee testified that Wanda’s supervisor had stated
that he “needed somebody younger.”78 At trial, Harley was
required to prove that her age was the “but-for” cause of her
termination.79 The fact that her age was a motivating factor in
the firing was not enough.80 Because Harley did not prove that
she would not have been fired but for her age, she lost.81 By
affirming the lower court’s use of the “but-for” analysis, the
Tenth Circuit silently extended Gross, requiring a “but-for”
causation showing against federal and non-federal employers
alike.
Similarly, several district courts have applied Gross in
claims against federal employers, which should be governed by
§ 633a rather than § 623. These federal employers include a V.A.
Hospital,82 the United States Army,83 the United States Small
Business Administration,84 the United States Army Corp of
Engineers,85 and the FDIC.86 None of these courts acknowledged
that the employers in question were governed by a section of the
ADEA that was never addressed in Gross. They all made their
decisions with the understanding that Gross was the applicable
standard to be used in all ADEA cases, regardless of whether the
employer was a federal or non-federal entity.
76

29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (“All personnel actions affecting
employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . in the
United States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission . . . shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age.”).
77
Harley, 416 F. App’x at 750.
78
Id. at 749–50.
79
Id. at 750–51.
80
Id. at 751 (“While Harley’s age was one of many reasons . . . for her
termination, Harley has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her age
was the ‘but-for’ cause of her termination. Harley simply has not shown that her age
was the reason for her termination.”).
81
Id. at 753–4.
82
Frankel v. Peake, Civ. No. 07-3539 (WJM), 2009 WL 3417448, at *3−4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 20, 2009).
83
Shelley v. Geren, No. CV-08-5045-RHW, 2009 WL 3783159, at *3 (E.D. Wash.
Nov. 6, 2009).
84
Guerrero v. Preston, No. H-08-2412, 2009 WL 2581568, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
18, 2009).
85
Wagner v. Geren, No. 8:08 CV 208, 2009 WL 2105680, at *4−5 (D. Neb. July 9,
2009).
86
Glenn v. Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2009).
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Other district courts have acknowledged that Gross did not
interpret § 633a but have made it clear that they are nonetheless
choosing to extend Gross’ holding to federal employers. In
Reynolds v. Department of the Army, a New Jersey district court
discussed the applicability of Gross, despite the fact that “[t]he
parties [did] not dispute the applicability of Gross’ ‘but-for’
causation requirement.”87 The court noted that “the ADEA
contains two distinct prohibition sections, one applicable to nonfederal employers, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and one applicable to
federal employers, § 633a(a). . . . The ADEA provision at issue in
Gross, however, dealt strictly with the non-federal employer
provision which has markedly different statutory language.”88
Nonetheless, because a majority of district courts had chosen to
extend the Gross holding, the Reynolds court ultimately decided
to do the same.89
B.

Limiting Gross

Other courts have declined to extend Gross to § 633a claims,
acknowledging the differences between §§ 623 and 633a, and the
fact that the Supreme Court’s analysis was limited to only the
former. In Ford v. Mabus, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia declined to require a “but-for” showing in a claim
brought against the United States Navy.90 The plaintiff, Richard
Ford, was denied a promotion, and the position was instead given
to someone twenty-five years younger than Ford.91 One of the
supervisors involved in the hiring process allegedly made a
comment about the negative impact the aging workforce was
having on the Navy.92 At trial, the district court found that Ford
had not met his burden of showing that his age was the “but-for”
cause of his firing, and therefore found in favor of the
government.93
The court of appeals remanded the case to determine if “age
was a factor in the Navy’s decision to deny [Ford] the
promotion.”94 Relying on statutory language, much as the Court
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

No. 08-2944 (FLW), 2010 WL 2674045, at *10 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010).
Id. at *10 n.5.
Id.
629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 200–01.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 207.
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in Gross did, the Ford court reasoned that the language in the
two sections of the statute could not be read to have the same
plain meaning. “[B]ecause of” in § 623 does not mean the same
thing as “based on” in § 633a.95 The court of appeals held that
“while a § 623 plaintiff must, as Gross holds, show that the
challenged personnel action was taken because of age, a § 633a
plaintiff must show that the personnel action involved ‘any
discrimination based on age.’ ”96 A “but-for” test was therefore
deemed inappropriate.
Many district courts have also declined to expand Gross into
the federal setting, relying primarily on the different language of
the two relevant statutory provisions of the ADEA. In Fuller v.
Gates, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
determined that “but-for” causation should not be required in a
suit brought against the Secretary of Defense.97 In Torres v.
McHugh, the District Court for the District of New Mexico held
that “Gross is inapplicable to the federal employer provision
which contains different statutory language.”98 Both the Fuller
and Torres courts reasoned that Gross’ application should be
limited to those cases involving the statutory provision of the
ADEA that the Supreme Court actually interpreted in Gross,
§ 623.99
For the reasons discussed in Part III below, the approach
taken by the Ford, Fuller, and Torres courts is the more
appropriate of the two. By declining to extend Gross to federal
employers, these courts are truer to the language of the statute,
and to the holding of Gross itself.
III. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION AND THE
BENEFITS OF A “SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR” TEST
The first part of this section describes the reasons why Gross
should not be extended to § 633a federal employer cases, relying
on norms of statutory interpretation and policy considerations.
95

Id. at 205.
Id.
97
No. 5:06-CV-091, 2010 WL 774965, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (“The
language of § 633a(a) compels the court to conclude that a mixed-motive analysis
continues to apply in claims against the government.”).
98
701 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1222 (D.N.M. 2010). However, the Torres court
reluctantly applied “but-for” causation because of other binding Tenth Circuit
precedent obligating it to do so. Id. at 1222–23.
99
Id. at 1222; Fuller, 2010 WL 774965, at *1.
96
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The elements of statutory interpretation discussed include the
plain meaning of the language used in § 633a as compared to
§ 623, the structure of § 633a as compared to § 623, and the
structure of the ADEA generally. The policy considerations
discussed include the additional remedies available to federal
employers and the historical notion that federal workers are held
to a higher standard than their private counterparts.
Having explained why Gross’ “but-for” causation standard
should not be used, the second part of this section proposes an
alternative “substantial factor” causation test. Such a test would
be truer to the language of § 633a and diminish many of the
policy concerns raised by a “but-for” test.
A.

Gross Should Not Be Extended To Apply to § 633a

The norms of statutory interpretation suggest that § 623
should be understood differently than § 633a. There is a long
accepted method for interpreting federal statutes. Courts first
look to the statute’s textual plain meaning, then to statutory
structure, and then to sources outside the four corners of the
statute itself.100 In this case, all of these factors suggest that
§ 633a should not be interpreted to mean the same thing as
§ 623.
The first step in this process is to look at the statutory
language in light of “its textual plain meaning, as gleaned from
ordinary usage, dictionaries, grammar, and linguistic canons.”101
Ironically, Gross itself is an excellent example of the proposition
that courts will look to the plain meaning of the words of a
statute when construing its meaning.102 In Gross, the Court said
that “ ‘[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.’ ”103

100
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2042
(2006) (book review) (summarizing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990)).
101
Id. (emphasis added).
102
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009).
103
Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S.
246, 252 (2004).
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The plain meaning of § 623 was established by the Supreme
Court in Gross. The § 623 ADEA language in question makes an
adverse employment action illegal where the action takes place
“because of [an] individual’s age.”104
After consulting a
dictionary, the Court determined that the plain meaning of
“because of” is “by reason of,”105 which in turn requires a showing
that but for the employee’s age, the adverse employment action
would not have occurred.106
Section 633a uses different language than § 623, and
therefore cannot automatically be read as having the same plain
meaning. Instead, the actual language used must be interpreted.
“[I]t is through the ‘dint of . . . phrasing’ that Congress speaks,
and where it uses different language in different provisions of the
same statute, we must give effect to those differences.”107 Where
Congress uses different language within the same statute, as was
done here, it can be assumed that it did so intentionally. While
§ 623 bans discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age,”108
§ 633a bans “any discrimination based on age.”109 MerriamWebster’s, the Supreme Court’s dictionary of choice in Gross,110
defines “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind.”111 As the Court has previously stated, “[r]ead naturally,
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ”112 Where Congress uses the
word “any” without adding additional language to modify it, its
breadth remains unlimited.113 The type of discrimination covered
under § 633a is therefore very extensive.

104

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
106
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 (2007).
107
Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
108
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
109
Id. § 633a(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
110
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
111
Any Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/any (last visited March 18, 2013).
112
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 97 (1976)).
113
See Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
105
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Furthermore, “based on” means “to . . . form a foundation
for.”114 Something serves as a foundation for an action when it is
an integral or substantial part of the action upon which other
factors are added.
The foundation is not necessarily the
determinative element, but it is nonetheless important to the
action. An action is based on a given element when that element
is a fundamental reason behind it.
Coupled together, the plain meaning of § 633a’s freedom
from “any discrimination based on age” is that employees shall be
free of “whatever kind” of age discrimination, so long as age is
the foundation upon which the discrimination is based. Section
633a’s plain language, therefore, suggests a causation analysis
different from the “but-for” test put forth in Gross for use with
§ 623. While § 623 protects against age discrimination in a
certain limited context, § 633a is much more expansive in the
type and degree of age discrimination that it protects against.
Because “any” and “based on” are more inclusive than “because
of,” it follows that a greater degree of discrimination should be
included. A less stringent showing of discrimination would
therefore suffice. A substantial factor test is one way this burden
could be established, as will be discussed in the following section.
In addition to plain meaning, courts also look at sentence
structure and syntax. Sections 623 and 633a contain a structural
difference that sets them apart, as noted by the Court of Appeals
in Ford v. Mabus. “Because of” in § 623 modifies “to fail or refuse
to
hire,”
whereas
“based
on”
in
§ 633a
modifies
“discrimination.”115 In practice, this means that “while a section
623 plaintiff must, as Gross holds, show that the challenged
personnel action was taken because of age, a section 633a
plaintiff must show that the personnel action involved ‘any
discrimination based on age.’ ”116 Once again, the plain meaning
of the statute suggests that the federal employee provision offers
a more expansive form of protection than does its non-federal
counterpart. “Recognizing the ‘sharp[]’ difference between these

114
Base, v.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/15856 (last visited March 18, 2013). The Oxford English Dictionary is used
here rather than Merriam-Webster’s, used by the Court in interpreting § 623,
because Webster’s definition of “based” was self-referential (“to serve as a base for”)
and less helpful.
115
Ford, 629 F.3d at 205.
116
Id.
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two provisions, the Supreme Court in Gomez-Perez v. Potter
described section 633a as a ‘broad, general ban on discrimination
based on age,’ ” as compared with the more lenient § 623.117
The next source that federal courts generally turn to in
construing statutory meaning is the “statutory structure.”118
Much like the plain meaning of the language and structure of the
provisions, this factor too suggests that §§ 623 and 633a should
be treated differently. On the issue of statutory structure, the
Supreme Court has previously stated that §§ 623 and 633a are
completely independent provisions, which do not substantively
affect one another.119
Section 633a is “self-contained and
unaffected by other sections” of the ADEA.120 Therefore, the
Court’s interpretation of § 623 should not have an impact on
§ 633a, and the same test need not be used in both sections.
The fact that Congress enacted separate sections for federal
and non-federal employers in the ADEA should not be
overlooked.
The original ADEA did not apply to federal
employers.121 In 1972, an amendment was introduced that would
have expanded the language of § 623 to include federal
employers.122 One of the reasons given for the amendment by the
bill’s author, Senator Bentsen, was the “subtle” discrimination
against “Federal employees who [were] ignored or harassed by
their superiors.”123 Before passage, the bill was restructured “to
remove the federal government from the general definition of
employer and to place appropriate substantive provisions in a
separate section.”124
Ultimately, Congress added an entirely new section to the
ADEA in order to specifically address the distinctive problem of
age discrimination in federal employment.125 Section 633a was
created to apply solely to federal employers, and Congress chose
not to use the same language in that section as it had in § 623.

117
Id. (quoting Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 486, 488 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
118
Eskridge, supra note 100.
119
Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1981).
120
Id. at 168.
121
Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 65–66 (2d Cir. 1989).
122
Id.
123
118 Cong. Rec. 7745 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
124
Bornholdt, 869 F.2d at 66; 118 Cong. Rec. 15,894–95.
125
See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 166–67 (comparing the applicability of jury trials to
each of the provisions).
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The fact that Congress gave federal employers their own
subsection suggests that they are held to a different standard,
which prevents them from being grouped together with everyone
else in § 623.
Section 633a also gives special consideration to federal
employees when it comes to bringing their claims, which is not
mirrored in § 623. Even before the ADEA was enacted, federal
discrimination claims were dealt with through the Civil Service
Commission (the “CSC”), providing federal employees with a
great deal of protection that was not available outside of the
federal context.126 After the ADEA was passed and amended to
cover federal employees, “Congress empowered the CSC ‘to
enforce the provisions of [§ 633a(a)] through appropriate
remedies.’ ”127
Today, § 633a(b) specifies that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) is
authorized to enforce the ADEA.128 Only federal employees are
entitled to have their claims heard by this committee.
The fact that federal employees are given a different channel
through which to bring their claims suggests that Congress did
not intend §§ 623 and 633a to function in the same way. As
Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent in Gomez-Perez v.
Potter, “civil service is a complex issue, requiring ‘careful
attention to conflicting policy considerations’ and ‘balancing
governmental efficiency and the rights of employees.’ The
resulting system often requires remedies different from those
found to be appropriate for the private sector (or even for the
States).”129 The difference in available remedies shows Congress’
acknowledgment that federal employees should be judged by a
different set of standards.
All of these statutory interpretation factors suggest that
§§ 623 and 633a should be kept separate and distinct.
Policy considerations also suggest that the two sections
should be treated differently. There is a history in the United
States of holding federal employers to a higher standard than
their non-federal counterparts simply because they are federal
employers. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (the “CSRA”)
126

Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 500–01 (2008).
Id. at 501.
128
29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
129
Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 389 (1983)).
127
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offers one such example.130 The CSRA states that “in order to
provide the people of the United States with a competent, honest,
and productive Federal work force reflective of the Nation’s
diversity, and to improve the quality of public service, Federal
personnel management should be implemented consistent with
merit system principles and free from prohibited personnel
practices.”131 The Act then goes on to lay out a merit-based
system for career advancement with federal employers.132 This
Act applies only to federal employees, suggesting that Congress
was not concerned with furthering similar competence, honesty,
and productivity in the private sector. It is only federal
employers that are held to this legislatively created higher
standard.
The federal government, by way of being the sovereign, is
responsible for the well-being and protection of every American
in a way that non-federal entities are not. The federal employers
previously mentioned, such as the Army, Navy, and Corp of
Engineers, all do critical work. Where age discrimination within
one of these organizations denies an opportunity to the most
qualified individual because of his or her age, the effect is
detrimental to American society as a whole.
B.

A “Substantial Factor” Test Should Be Implemented in
§ 633a Cases

Rather than “but-for” causation, or a mixed-motive burden
shifting analysis, this Note proposes that a “substantial factor”
test be used in § 633a claims. Under such a test, a plaintiff
would have to prove that age was a “substantial factor” in the
adverse employment action that occurred. Age need not be the
definitive reason, but it must be “material” to the events that
transpired.133
As previously discussed, in Gross, the Court outlined its
“but-for” test as requiring proof that “age was the ‘reason’ that
the employer decided to act.”134 Whether there are multiple
130
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of Title V).
131
Id. § 3(1).
132
Id. § 3(2).
133
See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W.
45, 49 (Minn. 1920) overruled on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183
N.W. 521 (1921); KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 265–68.
134
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
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motives or not, “[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence . . . that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged
employer decision.”135 Even if evidence of age discrimination is
present, it is deemed meaningless unless it is accompanied by
proof that the adverse action happened because of said
discrimination. The burden never shifts to the defendant to show
that the action would have happened regardless of age, so the
plaintiff is never afforded the opportunity to show that other
reasons given by the defendant for negative treatment are
pretextual.
The previously used Price Waterhouse test allowed a claim to
proceed on a showing of a partly discriminatory “mixed-motive.”
Under that test, so long as age was part of the reason for an
adverse employment action, an ADEA claim could be brought,
even if age was not a material factor.136 Since using this very low
burden of proof unencumbered would give rise to claims based on
only the slightest inference of discrimination, it was couched
within a burden shifting framework. After the plaintiff showed
that age was a factor, the employer then had the opportunity to
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken [age] into
account.”137 Where the employer did not meet this burden, the
plaintiff could prevail on his or her claim so long as age was a
factor in the adverse action.
Neither of these tests are apt for a § 633a analysis. As
previously discussed, statutory interpretation and policy
considerations rule out the “but-for” test because § 623 and
§ 633a are different in many substantial ways.138 Section 633a is
broader and intended to protect against more than a “but-for”
test allows. Additionally, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his
dissent in Gross, proving “but-for” causation in tort law is
different than proving it in the discrimination context because
the subjective intentions of individuals are often in question in

135

Id. at 177–78.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). In applying the
mixed-motive test in Gross, the district court instructed the jury that age was the
cause of the firing so long as it “played a part or a role” in the decision. Gross, 557
U.S. at 170–71. No amount of materiality was required. See id.
137
Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–74.
138
See supra Part III.A; Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 487–89 (2008).
136
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discrimination cases.139 Tort claims are conducive to “reasonably
objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical
causation.”140 Discrimination claims, on the other hand, rely “not
[on] physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that
constitute motive.”141 “But-for” causation places a heavy and
often insurmountable burden on the plaintiff, who needs to show
that but for what her discriminator was thinking, she would not
have been treated adversely.142
The “mixed-motive” analysis is also unsuitable for many of
the reasons pointed out by the Court in Gross in reference to
§ 623 claims. First, the “mixed-motive” burden shifting analysis
was intended for Title VII cases instead of ADEA cases and,
therefore, should not automatically be applied between statutes.
Title VII has been amended to provide for a “mixed-motive”
analysis, while the ADEA has not.143
Second, practically
speaking, Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive burden shifting has
proved to be unworkable. The burden shifting framework has
been difficult to explain to juries and has been the subject of
much debate.144 Although § 633a is meant to be protective, an
unencumbered “mixed-motive” standard would be too deferential.
Some proof that discrimination is the foundation for the
discriminatory action is needed. Neither the “but-for” test nor
the “mixed-motive” analysis appears to be the ideal solution to
the current state of ambiguity.

139
Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences
between the facts that generally give rise to tort law causation and the facts in
Gross).
140
Id. at 190. It should be noted that subjective intentions often play a crucial
role in tort law cases as well. Claims such as defamation, material
misrepresentation, and fraud all rely on proof of intent. The issue is not necessarily
that tort law is an inadequate means of analyzing subjective intent, as Justice
Breyer implies, but more generally, that subjective intent is never an easy point to
prove.
141
Id.
142
Acknowledging this onerous burden, tort law often looks to the materiality of
an event in determining if it is a cause. Where two forces are sufficient to bring
about a harm, a party may prove that one event was “material” to the outcome. The
harm may have still occurred without the event, but the event was a “substantial
factor” nonetheless. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 267–69.
143
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.
144
Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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A substantial factor test would be more practical than Gross’
inflexible “but-for” requirement and Price Waterhouse’s lenient
and unworkable “mixed-motive” burden shifting analysis. While
the language of § 633a does not specifically provide that age must
be a “substantial factor,” such a test would nonetheless be
compatible with the “any discrimination based on age” language.
As previously discussed, the plain meaning of this language, as
gleaned from dictionary definitions, is that age must be the
foundation upon which the decision is based.145 Requiring
something to be a “substantial factor” would ensure that it is an
integral part of the decision, as the language of the statute
requires. Unlike the “but-for” test, age need not be the reason for
the action. So long as age is a substantial factor, the claim may
be brought. Unlike the “mixed-motive” analysis, age cannot just
be a factor. Rather, it must be a substantial factor in order for
the claim to be brought.
The causation principles of tort law could be drawn upon in
formulating such a “substantial factor” analysis. Many different
areas of law borrow from tort law’s extensive causation
jurisprudence.146 Among these are anti-trust,147 civil RICO,148
and securities laws.149 In anti-trust law, causality analysis is
based on the tort understanding of proximate cause.150 Antitrust
law provides the framework, while tort law provides the
substance of the causation analysis. “The antitrust violation
need not be the only cause of [an] injury, but it must be a
material or substantial cause.”151 In civil RICO claims, the Court
has used tort concepts of causation to explain what a plaintiff
must prove in order to recover treble damages. The need for a
direct relationship between the conduct alleged and the injury
asserted is dependent upon the tort theory of proximate cause.152

145

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust
Analysis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 991–92 (2011).
147
Stephen V. Bomse et al., Procedural Aspects of Private Antitrust Litigation,
in 47TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR —DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING, at
771 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14482, 2008).
148
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992).
149
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005).
150
Bomse et al., supra note 147 (“Causality analysis in antitrust cases borrows
from tort law conceptions of proximate cause.”).
151
Id.
152
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69.
146
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In securities fraud claims, the Court requires a showing of
damages proximately caused by deception. As with RICO claims,
this proximate cause standard borrows from tort law.153
In Gross itself, the Supreme Court turned to tort law to help
explain the “but-for” causation that it was requiring in the age
discrimination context.154 The Court’s explanation that “[a]n act
or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the
particular event would have occurred without it” was borrowed
from Prosser and Keeton on Torts.155
It therefore seems
appropriate to borrow from tort law—and, for that matter, from
the same treatise—to provide a test for § 633a as well.
In tort law, under the substantial factor test “[t]he
defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.”156
Substantial factor is a self-explanatory phrase, not needing
further clarification or jury instruction.157 Generally, a showing
that something is a substantial factor will also be sufficient to
prove “but-for” causation, but this is not always the case.158
Something will be considered a “substantial factor” where “it [is]
so indispensable a cause that without it the result would not
have followed.”159
While this is similar to a “but-for”
requirement, it is not exactly the same. “But-for” is interpreted
to mean that the adverse action would not have occurred unless
discrimination was present, whereas “substantial factor”
provides that discrimination was material to the adverse
employment action, but not necessarily the deciding factor.
A “substantial factor” test is preferable to a “but-for” test or
“mixed-motive” analysis for a number of different reasons. First,
it ensures that Congress’ intent to afford more protection against
a broad array of discrimination is satisfied without leading to
preposterous results. It does this by requiring that age be a
material factor in the adverse employment action. Something
cannot be so trivial as to be immaterial, nor must it be so clearcut that it is determinative. Second, the “substantial factor” test
153

Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 344.
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009) (quoting
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60).
155
Id. at 177 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 60).
156
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 267 (emphasis added).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 267–68.
159
Id. at 268.
154
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is not dependent upon anything in § 623, keeping the sections
separate as Congress intended. It is instead based solely on an
independent reading of § 633a. Third, a “substantial factor” test
is consistent with long-held principles of tort law long adopted by
the Court to resolve statutory ambiguity.
Finally, a “substantial factor” test makes sense in light of the
unique evidentiary problems presented by employment
discrimination cases. Such a test does not require a plaintiff to
know things about her employer that would be impossible to
discern. Instead, it allows an employee to proceed wherever
there is proof that age was a substantial factor regardless of
other circumstances at play. It holds federal employers to a
higher burden than their non-federal counterparts in accordance
with historical traditions. The “substantial factor” approach
could help solve many of the problems associated with both
“mixed-motive” and “but-for” causation.
In the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note,160 an
employee was fired after leaving a review upon being told that
the office would “be better off with someone younger.” The
reason given for her termination was insubordination, stemming
from her storming out of the office without permission.
Under the “mixed-motive” test, this employee would be able
to meet her burden of proof at trial because the evidence suggests
that age was a factor in her firing. However, an employee armed
with much less evidence would also be able to bring the same
claim, opening the employer up to a great deal of liability over
even trivial matters.
Under the “but-for” test, this employee would not be able to
meet her burden of proof at trial. She would be required to show
that “but-for” her age, she would not have been fired. This would
be difficult since age was not given as the reason for her firing,
and her insubordination alone was reason enough to terminate
her. Even if she can prove that her employer had an underlying
discriminatory intent, this is irrelevant unless her firing would
not have occurred without it. Her employer’s discrimination
would be irrelevant.
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See supra Introduction (hypothesizing based on Harley v. Potter, 416 F.
App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2011) cert. denied sub nom. Harley v. Donahoe, 132 S. Ct. 844
(2011)).
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Under a “substantial factor” test, the fired post office
employee could succeed in meeting her burden of proof at trial.
She would have to show that her age was a substantial factor in
her termination.
Evidence of her supervisor’s derogatory
statements about her would likely suffice to meet this burden.
The “substantial factor” test would let the employee prove that
her supervisor’s biased attitude toward her based on her age was
material to her termination. Although she may not be able to
show that she would not have been fired “but-for” her age, she
would still be able to win because of the materiality of the
discrimination to the end result. Of these three tests, the
“substantial factor” test would therefore bring about the most
just result and provide employees with a reasonable degree of
protection, as intended by the ADEA.
CONCLUSION
Age discrimination is not an issue that is likely to go away
any time soon; the average age of the American worker will
continue to rise for years to come. The measures in place to deter
age discrimination in the workplace are as important today as
they were when the ADEA was enacted forty years ago. It is
crucial that courts interpret the various sections of the ADEA
consistently, so that plaintiffs know what is required of them
when bringing an ADEA claim. While the tests for each section
need not be the same, they should each be distinctly established.
Although the Supreme Court took an important step toward
causational clarity through its § 623 interpretation in Gross, the
§ 633a causation requirement is no clearer today than it was
before Gross was decided.
Because of the textual differences between the two sections,
as well as the different policies in play distinguishing federal
employees from their non-federal counterparts, Gross should not
be extended to § 633a, as several courts have already held.
Rather than the § 623 “but-for” causation requirement, courts
should consider a “substantial factor” test, as already developed
and proved effective in tort law.
Because of the importance of this issue and the unfortunate
continued prevalence of age discrimination in the workplace, a
determinative legislative or judicial solution to the problems
described above should occur in the near future. Until then,
§ 633a causation remains a Gross mess.

